An Alarming Report on Social Media Today is Unnerving Investors
Getting to the heart of global finance with an understanding of the Japanese Carry Trade
Let’s start with the article on X/Twitter that has investors frightened: https://x.com/ttmygh/status/1990410914072342570?s=51&t=wbu6KdG0NVYrOJCOTt2-Cw
It’s important for everyone to understand what’s happening.
What is the Japanese carry trade? Why is it important? What factors must happen for it to stop/reverse? These are questions that get to the heart of global finance.
I prepared two responses: Option A for retail investors and Option B for institutional investors.
But first, here’s a detailed breakdown of the Japanese carry trade.
1. What is the Japanese Carry Trade?
The Japanese Yen Carry Trade is a financial strategy where an investor borrows money in Japanese Yen at a very low interest rate and then invests that money in assets in another country that offer a much higher return (e.g., US Treasury bonds, European stocks, emerging market debt).
Think of it like this:
1. Borrow Cheap: An investor goes to a Japanese bank and borrows 1 billion yen. Because Japan has had near-zero interest rates for decades, the interest on this loan is minimal (e.g., 0.1%).
2. Convert Currency: The investor immediately sells the 1 billion yen and converts it into another currency, say, US dollars. They now have roughly $6.5 million (depending on the exchange rate).
3. Invest for High Yield: The investor uses these dollars to buy a high-yielding asset, like US government bonds paying 5%. They pocket the difference between the yield (5%) and their borrowing cost (0.1%)—a tidy profit of ~4.9%, known as the “carry.”
4. Repay the Loan (Eventually): At some point in the future, the investor must sell their dollar-denominated asset, convert the dollars back to yen, and repay the original yen loan.
The core bet is twofold:
The Interest Rate Differential: The high-yielding asset continues to pay more than the cost of the yen loan.
Stable or Weakening Yen: The exchange rate doesn’t move against them. A strengthening yen makes it more expensive to buy back the yen needed to repay the loan, which can wipe out the trading profits.
2. Why is it Important?
The Japanese carry trade is not just a niche strategy; it’s a massive force in global markets for several reasons:
Source of Global Liquidity: It funnels trillions of yen into global financial systems. This “cheap money” flows into bonds, stocks, and real estate around the world, inflating asset prices and providing capital for governments and corporations.
Impact on Currency Values: The constant selling of borrowed yen to buy other currencies creates persistent downward pressure on the yen’s value. Conversely, it supports the value of higher-yielding currencies like the USD, AUD, and NZD.
“Canary in the Coal Mine” for Risk: The carry trade is a high-risk, high-reward strategy. When investors are feeling optimistic and confident (”risk-on”), they engage heavily in carry trades. When fear takes over (”risk-off”), they unwind them. This makes the yen a key barometer of global risk sentiment. A rapidly strengthening yen is often a signal that investors are panicking and deleveraging risky positions globally.
Financial Stability Concerns: Because the trade is so widespread and leveraged, a rapid and synchronized “unwind” of the carry trade can create violent swings in currency and asset markets, potentially leading to financial instability.
3. What Factors Must Happen for it to Stop/Reverse?
The carry trade is a delicate equilibrium. For it to stop being attractive or, more dramatically, to reverse (an “unwind”), one or more of the core conditions that make it profitable must change. Here are the key factors:
Factor 1: Japan Raises Its Interest Rates (The Most Direct Cause)
This is the most straightforward factor. If the Bank of Japan (BoJ) significantly raises its policy interest rate, the cost of borrowing yen increases. This narrows or even eliminates the interest rate differential that makes the trade profitable.
What to watch: The BoJ moving away from its ultra-loose monetary policy (like Yield Curve Control) and hiking rates for the first time in years.
Factor 2: Other Major Economies Cut Their Interest Rates
If the US Federal Reserve or the European Central Bank starts cutting their interest rates aggressively, the “high yield” part of the equation disappears. The gap between, say, US and Japanese rates shrinks, making the trade less appealing.
What to watch: A rapid shift to a rate-cutting cycle by the Fed in response to a recession.
Factor 3: A Sharp and Sustained Strengthening of the Yen (The “Unwind” Trigger)
This is often the most violent catalyst for a reversal. If the yen appreciates sharply, carry traders face massive losses.
Why does the yen strengthen?
Global Risk-Off Event: A major geopolitical crisis, a global recession, or a financial market crash (like 2008). In times of panic, investors rush to sell risky assets globally. They need to repay their cheap yen loans, which forces them to buy back yen, causing its value to skyrocket. This is known as the yen being a “safe-haven” currency during turmoil.
Speculative Attack: If traders collectively believe the yen is too weak and start betting on its appreciation, they can trigger a self-fulfilling prophecy.
BoJ Intervention: The Japanese government directly entering the forex market to buy yen and sell dollars to prop up its currency.
Factor 4: A Reduction in Global Risk Appetite
Even without a full-blown crisis, if the outlook for global growth dims, the perceived risk of holding foreign assets rises. Investors may decide that the potential 4-5% carry profit is no longer worth the risk of a currency move or a drop in the asset’s price, leading them to voluntarily unwind their positions.
Summary of a Carry Trade Unwind:
The process of reversal is a vicious cycle:
1. A trigger occurs (e.g., a global panic or BoJ rate hike).
2. Investors sell their foreign assets (US bonds, etc.) to raise cash.
3. They sell that foreign currency (e.g., USD) and buy Japanese Yen to repay their loans.
4. This massive wave of yen buying causes the yen’s value to surge.
5. The surging yen causes losses for any remaining carry traders, forcing them to also unwind their positions, which further fuels the yen’s rise in a destructive feedback loop.
In essence, the Japanese carry trade is a powerful engine of global capital that runs on stability and interest rate differences. It grinds to a halt—or slams into reverse—when that stability is shattered or the fundamental interest rate dynamic flips.
Option A
The Great Unwind
How the Collapse of the Japanese Carry Trade Could Trigger a Global Liquidity Crisis in the Next 45 Days
Investor Focus: The 45-Day Carry Trade Watchdog
The theoretical risk of a carry trade unwind is now a tangible, measurable one. The factors that could trigger it are no longer hypothetical; they are on the calendar and visible in the data. For the next 30-45 days, investors should ignore the noise and focus on these four critical pillars.
The Core Thesis: The 30-year era of free funding from Japan is under direct threat. This is not a prediction of an immediate crash, but a warning that the underlying support for global asset prices is being kicked away. Your focus must shift from fundamentals to flows and central bank signaling.
The Investor’s Dashboard: 4 Pillars to Watch
1. The Bank of Japan (BoJ) – The Primary Catalyst
Key Date: December 18th – The next BoJ policy meeting.
What to Watch: Any signal of a further reduction in its Yield Curve Control (YCC) policy or, more critically, a direct interest rate hike. The market is now hypersensitive to Japanese monetary policy.
Actionable Insight: Don’t just wait for the decision. Monitor the commentary from BoJ officials in the weeks leading up to the meeting. Hawkish leaks will move markets before the 18th. A hike or a strong signal towards one is the most direct “Sell” signal for the carry trade.
2. The US Treasury Market – The Epicenter of the Shockwave
Key Metric: The 10-Year Treasury Yield and, just as importantly, the bid at Treasury auctions.
What to Watch: As your notes highlighted, Japanese investors are the largest foreign holders of US debt. If they are selling to repatriate capital or because hedging costs are prohibitive, we will see it in weak demand at Treasury auctions. This is a direct test of who will fund the US government if Japan steps back.
Actionable Insight: A “tail” in a major Treasury auction (when the yield awarded is higher than expected) is a red flag. It indicates poor demand and is a direct precursor to the “explosion” in rates you mentioned. Watch the 10-year yield; a sustained break above recent highs confirms the flow dynamics are turning negative.
3. The Yen (USD/JPY) – The Unwind Gauge
Key Metric: The USD/JPY exchange rate.
What to Watch: A sharp, sustained drop in USD/JPY (a strengthening Yen) is the clearest real-time signal that the carry trade is unwinding. It means borrowers are selling dollars (and other assets) to buy yen to repay their loans.
Actionable Insight: Treat a decisive break below a key technical support level (e.g., 150, then 145) as a risk-off signal for all levered assets, not just currencies. This is the market’s panic button.
4. Global Risk Sentiment – The Contagion Indicator
Key Metrics: Credit Spreads (especially High-Yield debt) and the Volatility Index (VIX).
What to Watch: As your notes correctly warn, the first victims of a liquidity withdrawal are the most indebted “zombie” companies and overvalued growth stocks. A significant widening of credit spreads indicates stress in the corporate debt market. A spiking VIX shows fear is entering the equity market.
Actionable Insight: Don’t wait for the S&P 500 to crash 10%. Watch the “canaries in the coal mine.” If high-yield bond ETFs (like HYG) start falling sharply and credit spreads widen, it means the rot has started. This often happens before the main stock indices collapse.
The Bottom Line for the Next 45 Days
The situation has moved from academic to active. The BoJ has already, in effect, “killed the money printer” by allowing its yields to rise. The question is whether they will fire a second shot on December 18th.
Your strategy is no longer about prediction; it’s about reaction. Use the dashboard above. If two or more of these pillars flash red simultaneously—for instance, a hawkish BoJ signal (Pillar 1) and a weak Treasury auction (Pillar 2)—the probability of a full-scale, disorderly unwind increases exponentially.
This is not a time for conviction. It is a time for vigilance. The largest source of global liquidity in a generation is reversing, and the market has not yet fully priced it in. Your job is to watch for the signs that it is.
Option B
The Structural Resilience of Global Liquidity: A Forensic Analysis of the November 2025 Japanese Volatility and the Evolution of the Carry Trade
1. Executive Summary
The global financial architecture has long operated under the shadow of a theoretical singularity: the unwinding of the Japanese Yen carry trade. For three decades, the Bank of Japan’s (BoJ) ultra-loose monetary policy has functioned as the world’s liquidity anchor, funding risk assets from Mumbai to Manhattan. The pervasive bearish thesis—succinctly captured in the document ‘Carry Trade Op-ed November 18 2025’—posits that the normalization of Japanese rates represents a systemic “margin call” on global leverage, destined to trigger a repatriation of capital, a collapse in US Treasury demand, and a violent repricing of equity markets.1 This perspective frames the rise in Japanese Government Bond (JGB) yields as the harbinger of a liquidity vacuum, necessitating an immediate defensive posture by sophisticated investors.
However, a granular reconstruction of market dynamics between November 10 and November 18, 2025, reveals a fundamental decoupling between this catastrophic theory and the empirical reality of modern capital flows. During this critical window, JGB yields did indeed surge, with the 10-year benchmark breaching 1.75%—a level unseen since 2008 2—and super-long maturities hitting multi-decade highs.4 Yet, the anticipated contagion failed to materialize. Instead of collapsing, US equity markets recovered sharply following the resolution of the government shutdown 5, US Treasury auctions witnessed near-record foreign participation 6, and the Japanese Yen (JPY) weakened rather than strengthened, defying the traditional mechanics of a carry trade unwind.7
This report argues that the prevailing bearish consensus relies on an obsolete heuristic that conflates nominal yield increases with monetary tightening. It fails to account for the regime change precipitated by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s “Sakaenomics,” a policy framework characterized by aggressive fiscal expansion and political constraint on the central bank. The surge in JGB yields in November 2025 was not a signal of monetary restriction attracting capital, but rather a risk premium adjustment to a looming fiscal deluge. Consequently, the Yen weakened due to inflation expectations, maintaining the viability of the carry trade. Furthermore, the resilience of the US market is underpinned not by fragile leverage, but by a structural divergence in productivity driven by the artificial intelligence sector and robust corporate credit fundamentals. The “Great Unwind” is not an imminent event but a gradual, manageable transition, wherein the US Treasury market remains the solitary destination for large-scale capital preservation amidst the degradation of Japan’s fiscal balance sheet.
2. The False Prophet: Deconstructing the November 18 Op-Ed
The document under review presents a “45-Day Carry Trade Watchdog,” a heuristic dashboard designed to detect the onset of a systemic crisis. While the logic is rooted in historical precedents like the 1998 LTCM crisis or the 2013 Taper Tantrum, its application to the 2025 landscape demonstrates a misunderstanding of the current causal relationships in global finance.
2.1 Pillar 1: The Bank of Japan (BoJ) – The Misinterpreted Signal
The Op-ed identifies the BoJ as the “primary catalyst,” warning that any signal of a rate hike or reduction in bond buying is a direct “Sell” signal for the carry trade.1 This binary interpretation ignores the profound political pressure currently exerted on the central bank.
On November 18, 2025, BoJ Governor Kazuo Ueda held his first bilateral meeting with Prime Minister Takaichi. While Ueda signaled that the BoJ is “gradually adjusting” accommodation to align with the 2% inflation target, he simultaneously emphasized the necessity of “closely cooperating with the government”.8 The market’s reaction was instructive: rather than fearing a hawkish pivot, investors focused on the political constraints. Takaichi’s administration has publicly advocated for maintaining low rates to support her “high-pressure economy” agenda, effectively stripping the BoJ of its independence in the eyes of the bond market.10
The document assumes that a rate hike signifies a withdrawal of liquidity that strengthens the Yen. However, recent BoJ working papers suggest that the sensitivity of capital investment to interest rates has declined due to the rise of intangible assets and globalization, meaning the economy can absorb higher rates without a crash.11 The rise in yields witnessed in mid-November was driven by the bond market front-running the government’s fiscal issuance, not the central bank’s policy rate. When yields rise due to supply fears (fiscal dominance) rather than policy restriction (monetary dominance), the currency depreciates. This dynamic invalidates the Op-ed’s core assumption that higher yields inevitably trigger a Yen-strengthening unwind.
2.2 Pillar 2: The US Treasury Market – The Repatriation Fallacy
The Op-ed posits that Japanese investors, as the largest foreign holders of US debt, will retreat from Treasury auctions if domestic yields rise, causing a “tail” (weak demand) and driving US rates explosively higher.1 This “repatriation thesis” is a staple of bearish commentary but lacks empirical support in the current data.
Data from the week of November 10, 2025, explicitly refutes the notion of a buyer’s strike. The 10-year US Treasury Note auction on November 12 was a resounding success, with indirect bidders (a proxy for foreign demand) capturing 83.1% of the issuance—the second-largest share on record.6 Even the 30-year Bond auction on November 13, which the Op-ed might flag as a “tail” due to the high yield of 4.694% (vs. 4.684% expected), saw indirect bidders take 67.0%, a figure above the recent six-auction average.12
This robust demand illustrates a crucial flaw in the repatriation argument: it ignores the concept of yield pickup relative to credit quality. Even with JGBs at 1.75%, the spread against US Treasuries trading above 4.0% remains a compelling 225+ basis points.14 Furthermore, Japanese institutional investors, particularly life insurers, manage liabilities that extend decades into the future. The depth and liquidity of the US Treasury market have no substitute. The liquidity enhancement auctions conducted by Japan’s Ministry of Finance (MoF) on November 7 highlight the contrasting fragility of the JGB market, where liquidity pockets can evaporate quickly.15 For a Japanese allocator, repatriating capital into a volatile, illiquid domestic market is a risk, not a refuge.
2.3 Pillar 3: The Yen (USD/JPY) – The Broken Correlation
The document claims that a “sharp, sustained drop in USD/JPY” (Yen strength) is the clearest real-time signal of unwinding.1 This relies on the mechanism where rising domestic rates attract capital flows, boosting the currency.
However, the market behavior in November 2025 demonstrated a “bad rise” in yields. As JGB yields spiked to multi-decade highs, the Yen weakened, with USD/JPY rising to test the 155 level on November 18.7 This divergence is the death knell for the simple carry trade unwind thesis. The market is pricing in the inflationary consequences of the proposed ¥17 trillion stimulus package.17 Investors are selling the Yen because they anticipate that the government’s fiscal profligacy will debase the currency faster than the BoJ can raise nominal rates to defend it. Without Yen appreciation, there is no margin call pressure on foreign assets funded in Yen, and thus, no unwind.
2.4 Pillar 4: Global Risk Sentiment – The Contagion Indicator
Finally, the Op-ed warns of widening credit spreads and a spiking VIX as “canaries in the coal mine”.1
Reviewing the data from mid-November, US high-yield credit spreads remained remarkably contained, hovering around 302-309 basis points.18 This level is historically tight and indicative of robust corporate health. The VIX did not spike to crisis levels; instead, volatility receded as the US government shutdown ended.5 The resilience of credit markets suggests that the volatility in Japan was viewed by global capital allocators as an idiosyncratic sovereign debt repricing, rather than a systemic credit event. The “rot” predicted in the corporate debt market 1 is simply absent from the data.
3. The Event Horizon: November 10-18, 2025
To fully understand the resilience of the global system, one must reconstruct the timeline of events that occurred during the week in question, identifying the true drivers of market movement that the Op-ed overlooked.
3.1 The Resolution of the US Government Shutdown
A critical variable missing from the bearish thesis is the resolution of the US fiscal standoff. On November 10, 2025, the US Senate voted 60-40 to advance a funding bill, ending the longest government shutdown in history.5 This event removed a significant drag on US GDP estimates and restored investor confidence in the immediate stability of the US economy.
The recovery in US equities was immediate and broad-based. The S&P 500 and Nasdaq reacted to the removal of fiscal uncertainty, overshadowing the bond market volatility in Tokyo. This underscores the dominance of US domestic factors over international flow dynamics. While Japanese rates matter, they are secondary to the operational continuity of the US government and the earnings trajectory of American corporations.
3.2 The JGB Yield Surge: Fiscal vs. Monetary Drivers
While the US stabilized, the Japanese bond market experienced a historic sell-off. This was not a uniform shift but a “bear steepening,” concentrated in the super-long maturities (20, 30, and 40 years).
Lack of liquidity, fiscal risk premium.
The catalyst for this surge was not hawkish monetary policy, but the realization of the sheer scale of Prime Minister Takaichi’s spending plans. Markets began pricing in a “fiscal risk premium.” The divergence between the 10-year yield (anchored somewhat by BoJ expectations) and the 40-year yield (pure fiscal risk) highlights that investors are worried about the supply of bonds, not just the price of money. This distinction is vital: a supply-driven yield spike is negative for the currency, reinforcing the Yen weakness that prevents a carry unwind.
3.3 The Domestic Economic Paradox: Contraction vs. Inflation
Adding to the complexity was the release of Japan’s Q3 GDP data, which showed an annualized contraction of 1.8%.22 The Op-ed’s thesis implies a booming economy overheating and requiring rate hikes. The reality was a stagflationary contraction.
Key contributors to this contraction included a 32.5% annualized drop in residential real estate investment.22 This was not due to interest rates, but rather a regulatory shock: changes to Japan’s building code in April regarding energy efficiency created a bottleneck in permitting. Additionally, exports fell due to the impact of US tariffs.23
This economic weakness creates a “Goldilocks” scenario for the carry trade. The economy is too weak for the BoJ to hike rates aggressively (protecting the low funding cost), but the government is responding with massive stimulus (weakening the currency). The result is a continuation of the low-rate, weak-yen environment that fosters the carry trade, even as nominal yields drift higher.
4. The “Takaichi Put” and Sakaenomics
The governing dynamic of Japanese markets has shifted from “Abenomics” to “Sakaenomics” under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. Understanding this political economy is essential to grasping why the bearish thesis failed.
4.1 Fiscal Dominance and the “Responsible” Paradox
Prime Minister Takaichi’s administration is defined by a push for a “high-pressure economy.” Following the LDP’s loss of its majority and the subsequent coalition split with Komeito 24, Takaichi has been forced to court the support of the Japan Innovation Party and other pro-growth factions. This has led to the formation of the “Responsible and Expansionary Fiscal Policy Caucus,” which is demanding a supplementary budget of up to ¥25 trillion ($160 billion).21
This magnitude of spending, in a country with a debt-to-GDP ratio exceeding 260% 25, signals a regime of Fiscal Dominance. In such a regime, the central bank is effectively subordinate to the treasury; it cannot raise rates to combat inflation if doing so would make the government’s debt service unsustainable. The bond market’s sell-off in November was a recognition of this supply shock.
4.2 The Inflationary Mechanism
Sakaenomics is explicitly inflationary. By combining massive fiscal injection with a constrained supply side (labor shortages and tariffs), the policy mix guarantees rising prices. Takaichi has even proposed abolishing the provisional gasoline tax and revising income tax exemptions to support consumption.26
For a currency to strengthen (and trigger a carry unwind), real rates (Nominal Rate minus Inflation Expectations) must rise. In November 2025, while nominal JGB yields rose, inflation expectations rose faster due to the stimulus announcements and Yen weakness. This kept real yields deeply negative. As long as Japanese real yields remain below those of the US, the fundamental anchor for the USD/JPY exchange rate remains intact.27
4.3 The Political “Put” on the Yen
Usually, a plummeting currency invites intervention. However, under Takaichi, the calculus has changed. US tariffs of 15% on Japanese exports have hurt competitiveness.28 A weaker Yen acts as a natural offset to these tariffs, aiding major exporters like Toyota and Tokyo Electron. Therefore, the political threshold for “pain” regarding Yen weakness is significantly higher than in previous administrations. Takaichi’s “frank talks” with Governor Ueda likely reinforced the need for monetary policy to support this export-driven buffer, effectively placing a political “put” under the carry trade.8
5. The Treasury Market Stress Test: A Granular Analysis
The Op-ed’s most specific warning was to watch for a “tail” in US Treasury auctions as evidence of Japanese abandonment. The actual auction data from November 2025 provides a definitive counter-narrative.
5.1 The 10-Year Note Auction (November 12)
The 10-year auction is the benchmark for global risk appetite.
High Yield: 4.074%
Bid-to-Cover: 2.43 (indicating healthy demand)
Indirect Bidders: 83.1% 6
The Indirect Bidder statistic is critical. Indirect bids are placed by foreign central banks and international investment managers. An allocation of 83.1% is not just strong; it is nearly historic. It suggests that despite the volatility in Tokyo, global capital viewed the 4% yield on US Treasuries as highly attractive. The “Japan panic” did not cross the Pacific.
5.2 The 30-Year Bond Auction (November 13)
The 30-year auction showed more nuance, which bears analysis.
High Yield: 4.694% (a “tail” of roughly 1 basis point above the when-issued yield).29
Indirect Bidders: 67.0%.12
Direct Bidders: 22.55%.12
While the Op-ed might seize on the “tail” as proof of trouble, the composition of bidders tells a different story. Indirect participation (foreigners) actually increased relative to the prior month (66.8%) and remained above the six-month average.12 The softness in the auction came from Primary Dealers, who took down slightly more inventory than usual. If Japanese lifers—the natural buyers of the 30-year bond—were engaging in a capital strike, the Indirect number would have collapsed significantly. It did not.
5.3 The “Competition for Chips” Thesis
Deutsche Bank research suggests a “competition for chips” between US and Japanese bonds.30 Theoretically, as JGB yields rise, they compete with Treasuries. However, market depth matters. During the JGB sell-off, traders reported “air pockets” and poor liquidity in Tokyo.31 In contrast, the US Treasury market maintained deep liquidity. For global allocators managing billions, the ability to enter and exit positions is as important as the yield itself. The US retains an exorbitant advantage in market structure that JGBs cannot match, ensuring that capital flight from Japan is more likely to head to the US than repatriation is to drain it.
6. The Evolution of the Carry Trade
The Op-ed assumes a traditional 1998-style carry trade structure: Hedge Funds borrowing Yen to buy Dollars. However, the structure of global capital flows has evolved into something far more structural and resilient.
6.1 From Speculative Shorts to Structural Longs
In previous cycles, the carry trade was dominated by “hot money.” Today, a significant portion of the outflow represents structural asset allocation by Japanese households and institutions.
NISA Flows: Changes to the Nippon Individual Savings Account (NISA) program have encouraged Japanese retail investors to move deposits from 0% yielding bank accounts into foreign equity funds. Surveys indicate that 42.5% of Japanese savers are relocating funds due to “higher interest rates” abroad, with online-only banks facilitating rapid deployment into global markets.32 This is a sticky, monthly flow of capital that is insensitive to minor fluctuations in the exchange rate.
Balance of Payments Dynamics: The Balance of Payments accounting shows that the US current account deficit is financed by these structural inflows.33 Japanese investors are not just buying bonds; they are buying US growth.
6.2 The Net International Investment Position (NIIP) Paradox
Japan remains the world’s largest creditor.34 The “Unwind” thesis assumes these assets must be sold to cover losses. However, with the Yen weakening to 155, the value of these foreign assets in Yen terms has exploded higher, improving the solvency ratios of Japanese financial institutions.
There is a paradox here: Repatriation usually occurs when domestic assets become more attractive than foreign ones. With US corporate credit yields still exceeding JGB yields by 300-400 basis points, and with the US economy growing faster than Japan’s contractionary environment, the incentive to repatriate is non-existent. The weakening Yen acts as a further disincentive to bring money home, as converting dollars back to Yen crystallizes a loss of purchasing power if the Yen continues to depreciate.
7. Global Contagion or Isolation? Sector Analysis
The resilience of US markets in November 2025 highlights a structural divergence. The S&P 500 is no longer a levered play on low rates; it is a growth play on technological transformation.
7.1 The Tech Decoupling and “AI Exceptionalism”
Historically, higher rates hurt long-duration assets like tech stocks. However, recent data shows US momentum stocks sold off before the BoJ news and rallied after it, suggesting the correlation is weakening.33 The robust balance sheets of US mega-cap tech companies make them less sensitive to financing costs.
Crucially, the US maintains a massive lead over rivals in critical technologies. The Critical Emerging Tech Index shows the US leading China and Europe in almost all sectors, particularly AI and quantum computing.35 This “AI Exceptionalism” acts as a magnet for global capital. Even if borrowing costs rise, capital will flow to where productivity and growth are highest. Japanese investors, aware of their own country’s lagging tech sector (exacerbated by regulatory hurdles), are structurally overweight US tech.
7.2 Crypto and Gold as Liquidity Gauges
Behavior in alternative assets further confirms the lack of a liquidity crisis. While Gold prices showed some softness, fluctuating around $4,200-$4,250, key support levels held, suggesting a pause rather than a liquidation.36 Similarly, Bitcoin faced selling pressure but showed bullish divergence signals in momentum indicators.37 If a true carry trade unwind were occurring—which is fundamentally a liquidity shock—these high-beta assets would have experienced a chaotic crash. Their orderly correction implies a repricing of risk, not a withdrawal of liquidity.
7.3 Credit Spreads as the True Signal
The source document correctly identifies credit spreads as a contagion indicator. However, the fact that spreads did not widen significantly in November 18 indicates that the “Japan Shock” was viewed as an idiosyncratic sovereign debt repricing, not a systemic credit event. The corporate “rot” predicted in the op-ed is absent from the data.
8. Future Outlook: The “Gradual Adjustment” Scenario
Looking ahead to the December 18 BoJ meeting and beyond, the probability of a “disorderly unwind” remains low.
8.1 The BoJ’s Narrow Path
Governor Ueda’s commentary suggests a “gradual” approach.8 The BoJ is acutely aware that aggressive tightening amidst a fiscal expansion could destabilize the JGB market (as seen in the UK’s “Liz Truss moment”). Therefore, the BoJ will likely engage in Yield Curve Management rather than rigid Control—allowing yields to drift higher to match global peers without shocking the system with a sudden policy rate hike. This gradualism allows global markets to digest the shift without panic.
8.2 What to Watch (The Real Dashboard)
Investors should replace the Op-ed’s dashboard with the following metrics to accurately gauge risk:
1. Japan Real Yields: Monitoring the spread between nominal JGB yields and inflation expectations. Only if real yields spike significantly (i.e., inflation falls while rates rise) should we fear a Yen surge.
2. Takaichi’s Polling Numbers: If her support drops, the fiscal stimulus might be watered down. A reduction in planned stimulus would lower JGB supply fears, potentially stabilizing the bond market but removing the “inflationary put” on the Yen.
3. US Indirect Bidding Trends: Continued strength here signals the “repatriation” narrative is false. A drop below 60% in indirect participation would be a genuine warning sign.
4. USD/JPY Technicals: The 155-160 zone is the new battleground. A break above 160 is more likely than a crash to 140, given the fiscal backdrop.8
9. Conclusion
The thesis presented in the ‘Carry Trade Op-ed November 18 2025’ suffers from a fatal analytical flaw: it applies a 20th-century monetary logic to a 21st-century fiscal reality. In the current Japanese political economy, rising yields are a symptom of fiscal expansion (”Sakaenomics”), not monetary restriction. The anticipated “Great Unwind” is a phantom menace, haunting a market that has structurally evolved beyond simple interest rate arbitrage.
The events of November 10-18, 2025, serve as a definitive stress test that the global financial system passed. The resilience of the US Treasury auctions, the recovery of equity markets following the government shutdown resolution, and the continued weakness of the Yen all point to a new regime. In this regime, the divergence between Japan’s fiscal profligacy and America’s productivity engine drives capital out of Japan and into the United States.
Sophisticated investors should look past the fear-mongering of a carry trade crash. The specific “red flags” of a BoJ hike or a Treasury auction tail have proven to be false positives in a world where Japan is actively reflating its economy through debt. The era of free money may be ending in Tokyo, but the era of the US Dollar’s dominance as the global store of value is far from over. The true risk is not the return of Japanese capital, but its accelerated flight.