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June 13, 2005
GM follow-up, Mon., June 13, 2005, 6:21 PM
As readers know, I have been generally positive to General Motors (NYSE: GM), but Friday got to me and I just threw in the towel. Sold to you at $35. Today GM closed at $34.45, down 1.6 pct from my Friday mid-day sale.
I can't even say that CNBC made me do it, although their cheerleading bit did help. No, the seeds were sown in the early 1980s, just after I joined the securities industry.
In addition to being a short-term trader, I have a long-term memory. I remember being in my final year of undergraduate business school when our case study took us out of town to another auto manufacturer called Studebaker -- The one that isn't around today.
In fact, at precisely noontime on the factory floor on the very day that a group of college students from Waterloo were talking to the workers about production techniques, Studebaker management was posting notices throughout the factory that the corporation had decided to quit. No prior warning; just a black and white announcement that the company was kaput.
So we went there to study good old U.S. manufacturing, and came back with an education in failed personnel relations and finances.
If only one of my fellow students had gone on to work for General Motors. They might not have taken their Road to Perdition.
As an aside, Tom Hanks says that he began to get insight into his character, in the movie of that name, through a Bible verse: "He who sows the wind shall reap the whirlwind."
The year I started in the securities industry (1981), there was a terrible bear market. What was happening in the business world at that time was that young MBA CPA's, like me (I held MBA, CA and CMA), were coming out of business school, having been taught some ridiculous stuff about big business and globalization and corporate takeovers and restructurings, and getting hired by the big corporations like GM. I chose another path.
General Motors began its slow corporate decline, in my view, when it decided to overlook its straightforward domestic problems, and focus on strengthening its global operations, and play the multinational game.
But that's what happens when you hire into management, Harvard MBAs and Wharton Finance grads who haven't traveled the world, or lived life, or learned to be responsible for other people's interests, yet.
Management at GM, including many of these new young guns, spent billions of dollars trying to re-invent Opel in Germany. It was in the GM plan to operate there with minimal labor union interference, as in the U.S.
But, they found, it doesn't work that way in Germany, or elsewhere in Europe. Later GM poured billions of dollars down the sewer in Korea (Daiwoo). They also took a minimal position in Japan (their greatest threat) through holdings in Isuzu and Suzuki in order to be an importer to the U.S. of micro cars and micro engines, while the size and weight of other Japanese cars shipped to the U.S. was increasing, and eroding GM's domestic market share accordingly.
It look s to me like GM's foreign holdings were assembled by a New York investment banker ready to leap from a tall building without a parachute. Compared to Toyota in the U.S., GM's "foreign family" looks like a dog's breakfast.
Back on their home turf, management was ignoring real issues. GM decided in the 80s and 90s to deal with their inferior product quality by offering bigger warranties and price incentives as though they were printing the billions of dollars they spent on this program. But, General Motors is not General Federal Reserve Bank.
Eventually GM downsized their luxury products until they were running head-to-head with Japanese and German competitors on wheelbase and engine displacement sizes, while sadly lacking in quality and style. How did management think they were going to win that competition?
According to an insider I spoke to about this -- one who has worked in management at GM, Ford and Toyota -- GM managers began to treat their dealer distribution network badly. Oppressive dealer agreements forced their dealers to accept product they didn't want, while watching Motors Holdings dealers (i.e., dealerships financed by GM Holdings) get a disproportionate share of high-demand, low-availability product -- making sure those dealers didn't lose GM money in tough times.
As GM management refused to listen to all its loyal dealers and loyal customers, many ended up taking their wallets elsewhere. Former GM Dealers opened foreign product franchises and formerly loyal GM customers went in increasing numbers to do business there.
Today, GM does have some exciting products, which I've written about, but it may be too late to re-excite the still-loyal dealers or customers who have personally endured bad experiences, while constantly hearing about the love-in at Toyota, Nissan, Honda, etc., over the past decade.
Chrysler was saved from bankruptcy by innovative thinking. I'm wondering today if GM management has it in them to think outside the box. It would be a shame to think back in ten years that they couldn't and didn't.
I got to thinking about this history of GM, not because I sold the stock Friday, but after I received the following piece of humor this afternoon from one of my readers who I suppose noted I had sold GM:
" Japanese Competition...
A Japanese company and an American company decided to have a canoe race on the Missouri River. Both teams practised long and hard to reach their peak performance before the race. On the big day, the Japanese won by a mile.
Afterward, the American team became very discouraged and morally depressed. The American management decided the reason for the crushing defeat had to be found. A Management Team made up of senior management was formed to investigate and recommend appropriate action.
Their conclusion was the Japanese had 8 people rowing and 1 person steering, while the American team had 8 people steering and one person rowing.
So American management hired a consulting company and paid them an incredible amount of money. After six months of hard work, they were advised that too many people were steering the boat, while not enough people were rowing.
So the American Team acted: To prevent losing to the Japanese again next year, the rowing team's management structure was totally reorganized to 4 steering supervisors, 3 area steering superintendents, and 1 assistant superintendent steering manager.
They also implemented a new performance system that would give the one person rowing the boat greater incentive to work harder. It was called the Rowing Team Quality First Program, with meetings, dinners and free pens for the rower.
Even new paddles and medical benefit incentives were promised for a winner.
Next year, the Japanese won by two miles.
Humiliated, the American management laid off the rower for poor performance, halted development of a new canoe, sold the paddles and cancelled all capital investments for new equipment.
The money saved was distributed to the senior executives as bonuses for a job well done."
Is it any wonder that even at business school, I was considered an "out of the box" thinker who would never do well in a big corporate environment? I see a problem, I grouch about it, then fix it.
I don't stand around watching people eat my lunch.
And admiring their productivity.
Posted by Posted by Bill Cara on June 13, 2005 06:22:58 PM | Category: Cara Today in the Market
Discourse
Manufacturing is the true wealth generator of a country and is a process of replenishing and renewing the economy. When all of its technology is transferred abroad, the US will learn their lesson the hard way. GM is not the beginning nor the end of this horrific loss of domestic manufacturing and its engineers, but is a harbinger of a collapse in the dollar at some unknown time in the future. And when that time comes, we will need more people in work clothes and less in suits.
Posted by: papillon at June 14, 2005 7:53 AM [link]

I worked as a software engineer for two companies that did complex automation projects. Company one had our department reporting to a manager who reported to the Vice President of Engineering. We had a ratio of engineers to management of 14:1.
Company two had a different management structure and the path from our department to the engineering vice president through group leaders, supervisors, managers, and so on gave a ratio of engineers to management of 1:1.
One to one.
I don't work there anymore. In tough times they would lay off engineers.
Posted by: Fred Boness at June 13, 2005 9:08 PM [link]